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Ergonomists have often meditated about a little game known as “the game of 15”: two 
players in turn say a number between 1 and 9, and each particular number may not be re-
peated; the game is won by the player who has first said three numbers whose sum is 15; 
if all numbers are exhausted and no combination of three numbers said by either player 
adds up to 15, the game is tied. These rules are simple enough, but the resulting game is 
not. To play it skilfully, each player needs to remember what numbers have been already 
said and mentally calculate all possible winning combinations, both to achieve one of 
them and to prevent the opponent from doing the same. Even good reasoners find it ex-
tremely difficult to master this game without the aid of pencil and paper, and such aids 
improve performance but do not make the game easier to play. As a result, the game of 
15 is rarely played, if ever. 
 Interestingly, there is another game which is isomorphic to the game of 15 and is 
extremely popular all around the world: Tic-Tac-Toe, also known as Noughts and Cross-
es. Figure 1 illustrates the isomorphism between the two games: there are exactly eight 
triplets of numbers between 1 and 9 whose sum is 15, and they correspond to the eight 
winning combinations on the 3x3 matrix of Tic-Tac-Toe (three rows, three columns, and 
two diagonals). To put a mark on a square of the Tic-Tac-Toe matrix is equivalent to say 
a number in the game of 15, thus preventing the opponent to occupy the same square / 
say the same number and at the same time gaining access to some potential strategies for 
victory. However, contrary to the game of 15, Tic-Tac-Toe is extremely easy to play ef-
fectively, mostly because it represents the same reasoning task in a format which allows 
to offload all the irrelevant cognitive workload and concentrate on the strategic features 
of the game (for extensive discussion of this case, see Norman, 1993). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Isomorphism between the game of 15 and Tic-Tac-Toe 
Cognitive offloading is also the key concern of Hoffmann’s article: the author is interest-
ed to assess to what extent two different Computer-Supported Argument Visualization 
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(CSAV) tools, RationaleTM (http://rationale.austhink.com/) and AGORA 
(http://agora.gatech.edu/), effectively reduce the cognitive load of the users, thus facilitat-
ing the achievement of their educational aim—to wit, improving argument evaluation and 
critical thinking. Hoffmann argues that AGORA is superior to RationaleTM in terms of 
cognitive offloading: the cognitive load that a learner has to handle to construct a good 
argument is more effectively delegated to the software in AGORA than what happens in 
RationaleTM. Since Hoffmann is the leader of the AGORA project, his endorsement of 
this software is hardly surprising: however, the paper presents objective arguments to 
compare the two CSAV tools, and I see no reason to suspect any bias or hidden agenda in 
Hoffmann’s line of reasoning. 
 Overall, I am inclined to agree with Hoffmann’s conclusion: it would seem in-
deed that AGORA permits greater cognitive offloading than RationaleTM, thus helping 
users to focus more on the relevant task supported by these tools, i.e. argument evalua-
tion. However, there are two important considerations that limit the relevance of such 
conclusion: first, the greater cognitive load required to use RationaleTM could well be the 
result of its greater expressivity, in comparison to AGORA; second, effective cognitive 
offloading in and by itself is not sufficient to pass judgment on rival CSAV tools, for rea-
sons different from those considered by Hoffmann. 
 Let us start with the first point: as Hoffmann admits, RationaleTM is designed to 
support the construction and analysis of a broad family of arguments, whereas AGORA 
focuses only on deductively valid arguments. Hence RationaleTM needs to define a rather 
general and loose system of rules, such that any kind of intuitively good argument can be 
represented within it, regardless of the pertinent standard of validity for that particular 
case (deductive, inductive, presumptive, etc.). In contrast, AGORA is dedicated only to 
represent deductively valid arguments, and it limits to seven the admissible argument 
schemes: modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, not-both syllogism, equiv-
alence, conditional syllogism, and constructive dilemma. Given its narrower scope, it is 
not surprising that AGORA can make use of more restrictive and unambiguous rules than 
RationaleTM. In particular, much of Hoffmann’s criticism of RationaleTM hinges upon the 
fact that its rules are cumbersome to handle for users and also present potential loopholes 
in terms of argument quality: as Hoffmann notes, in RationaleTM «arguments of different 
(or dubious) quality can be constructed which nevertheless fulfill the Rabbit Rule and the 
Holding Hands Rule» (p. 10). This is certainly true, but it seems to be the price one has to 
pay in order to have a more flexible CSAV tool, one that is not restricted to model deduc-
tively valid arguments. At least, such trade-off between cognitive offloading and expres-
sivity should be considered, when comparing different CSAV software. 
 More generally, drawing a comparison between two CSAV tools that are intend-
ed to analyze different sets of arguments (every intuitively good argument for Ra-
tionaleTM, only those that are deductively valid in the case of AGORA) risks confounding 
two different issues: the effectiveness of each tool, given its intended target, and the in-
structional legitimacy of such target. Hoffmann here aims to discuss the former, but the 
latter crops into the discussion anyway. Should we accept the more constraining rules of 
AGORA, in order to benefit from its effective cognitive offloading? Well, it ultimately 
depends on whether or not we are happy to work with a CSAV tool that only processes 
deductively valid arguments. There might well be contexts where this is an excellent op-
tion, for instance to familiarize students with real life examples of logical reasoning, as a 
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complement to an introductory course in logic. But in other contexts this limitation may 
be highly problematic, since even good everyday reasoning is rarely deductively valid 
(Paglieri & Woods 2011), thereby exceeding the expressive capacity of AGORA: so, for 
instance, this software would be rarely of practical use to help students reconstructing ar-
guments in political debates or newspaper articles. 
 This observation leads us to the second limitation of Hoffmann’s conclusion: the 
fact that AGORA allows an effective cognitive offloading is not sufficient to consider it supe-
rior to RationaleTM as a CSAV tool. Hoffmann agrees with this claim, but for reasons differ-
ent from those I will develop here. According to Hoffmann, “Cognitive Load Theory cannot 
be used to show the superiority of one CSAV tool over another since the actual cognitive 
load always depends on the expertise of the user” (p. 11). That is correct, but it is not such a 
formidable objection: after all, it can be circumvented by making one’s conclusion equally 
context-dependent. This is indeed Hoffmann’s strategy, when he speculates that  
… for learning the first steps of critical thinking—that is, to get a feeling of what an argu-
ment is, its structure, and its quality—it might be better to start with a system that provides 
more guidance and that allows the bootstrapping of those skills that can then be used for 
many other important things. (p. 11) 
In other words, the more limiting environment provided by AGORA could well be more 
adequate for absolute beginners, who would have serious troubles in handling the more 
open-ended and cognitively demanding rules of RationaleTM. 
 Fair enough. But the trouble here is that we do not know whether either AGORA 
or RationaleTM are in fact effective in pursuing their educational aims, regardless of the 
cognitive load they impose on users. As Hoffmann clarifies, the main function of these 
CSAV tools is to enable students to assess the quality of arguments; subordinately, they 
also aim to enable students to identify hidden assumptions in arguments (p. 6). The obvi-
ous question is whether either software is minimally successful in fostering these learning 
objectives, and according to what standard or metrics of evaluation: however, Hoff-
mann’s article presents no evidence of that. Without such evidence, any analysis of the 
cognitive load of these tools can tell us only half of the story: it could well be the case 
that AGORA is cognitively more cost-effective than RationaleTM, as Hoffmann argues, 
but this is relevant only insofar as AGORA is also at least equally successful as Ra-
tionaleTM in yielding instructional benefits to its users. This is indeed the cornerstone of 
any cost-benefit analysis of alternative software solutions: minimizing costs is important 
only if it does not jeopardize too much expected benefits. 
 Of course, assessing the efficacy of CSAV tools in achieving instructional aims 
requires empirical studies, most notably field studies on populations of users across dif-
ferent educational contexts. This goes well beyond the stated purposes of Hoffmann’s pa-
per, who is concerned here with purely theoretical considerations on cognitive load (p. 3). 
As a consequence, his analysis defines an interesting starting point in a very important re-
search direction, but further studies will be needed to really assess the comparative merits 
and shortcomings of different CSAV tools. 
 Incidentally, it is worth emphasizing that such comparison is now particularly 
urgent, so that Hoffmann is to be commended in drawing our attention to it. CSAV tools 
are proliferating, and it is paramount to get a better a understanding of whether they work 
or not, and to what extent and for what purposes—even more so, since the evidence of 
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their efficacy reviewed by Hoffmann is patched and conflicting (Carr 2003, Bell 2004, 
Twardy 2004, van Gelder et al. 2004). In order to perform a thorough evaluation, we will 
also have to pay more attention to specific details and concrete contexts: for instance, it is 
somehow disappointing that no description of the intended users of either AGORA or Ra-
tionaleTM is provided in the paper. This is not Hoffmann’s fault, but rather reflects the 
implicit universalistic ambition of such tools: even if they tend to be used mostly within 
University courses, in principle they are conceived as supporting argument assessment 
for all kinds of users—from children in primary school to adults. I believe this lack of 
specificity to be misguided: CSAV tools specifically tailored for the educational needs 
and competences of different populations of users would, to my mind, prove more effec-
tive in bootstrapping argumentation skills. Testing this hypothesis will of course require 
empirical studies: in fact, these are now much more relevant to establish the validity of 
CSAV tools than any armchair speculation on their features—even when such specula-
tion is carried out with great diligence and insight, as in the case of Hoffmann’s paper.  
REFERENCES 
Bell, P. (2004). Promoting students’ argument construction and collaborative debate in the science  
classroom. In: Linn, M.C., Davis, E.A., and Bell, P. (eds). Internet environments for science education 
(pp. 115-143). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Carr, C.S. (2003). Using computer supported argument visualization to teach legal argumentation. In: 
Kirschner, P.A., Buckingham Shum, S.J., and Carr, C.S. (eds). Visualizing argumentation: Software 
tools for collaborative and educational sense-making (pp. 75-96). London: Springer. 
Gelder, T. van, Bissett, M., and Cumming, G. (2004). Cultivating expertise in informal reasoning. Canadian 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Revue Canadienne De Psychologie Experimentale 58(2), 142-152. 
Hoffmann, M. (this volume). Cognitive effects of argument visualization tools. In F. Zenker (ed.),  
Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the  
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) (pp. 1-12). Windsor, ON (CD ROM). 
Norman, D. (1993). Things that make us smart. New York: Doubleday/Currency. 
Paglieri, F., and Woods, J. (2011). Enthymematic parsimony. Synthese 178(3), 461-501.  
Twardy, C. R. (2004). Argument maps improve critical thinking. Teaching Philosophy 27(2), 95-116. 
